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1. Introduction 
 
Mechanisms –‘… entities and activities organized in such a way that they are responsible for [a] 
phenomenon’ –  are now widely taken in philosophy of science to provide one of modern science’s 
basic explanatory devices.2 Among the many different kinds of things they explain are the 
regular(ish) behaviors recorded in ceteris paribus (cp) laws: like ‘Ceteris paribus, the arrival of  
neurotransmitter particles at the head of a neuron is followed by the release shortly after of 
neurotransmitter particles from the synaptic vesicles at the other end’; or the recurring elliptical 
orbits of the planets around the sun recorded in Kepler’s laws. In 1999 Nancy Cartwright 
introduced the idea of a ‘nomological machine’ characterized as a ‘fixed (enough) arrangement of 
components, or factors, with stable (enough) capacities that in the right sort of stable (enough) 
environment will, with repeated operation, gives rise to the kind of regular behavior that we 
represent in our scientific laws.’ (Cartwright, 1999, page 50)3 The description of the nomological 
machine explains the law, which holds ‘ceteris paribus’ – relative to the nomological machine and 
its proper operation. Much of the more recent literature on mechanistic explanation of cp laws 
can be seen to make the same supposition when it comes to explaining cp laws (e.g. Craver 2007, 
 
1 Nancy Cartwright’s work for this paper is based upon research supported by the National Science Foundation under 
grant no. 1632471 and the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and 
innovation program (grant agreement no. 667526 K4U), for which she is very grateful. It is acknowledged that the 
content of this work reflects only the authors’ views and that the ERC is not responsible for any use that may be made 
of the information it contains. 
2 This characterisation from Illari and Williamson, 2012 is labelled a “consensus concept” by them and by the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy article ‘Mechanisms in Science’ (Craver and Tabery, 2017). See that article for an extended 
discussion. Our characterisation of mechanisms in this paper is in accord with that, with Cartwright’s work on 
mechanisms and cp laws, and with the characterisations of the so-called ‘new mechanists’  
(including much of the work by newer ‘new mechanists’). As Craver and Tabery report: “Three characterizations are 
most commonly cited: 
• MDC: ‘Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive of regular changes from 
start or set-up to finish or termination conditions’ … 
• Glennan: ‘A mechanism for a behavior is a complex system that produces that behavior by the interaction of a 
number of parts, where the interaction between parts can be characterized by direct, invariant, change-relating 
generalizations’ ... 
• Bechtel and Abrahamsen: ‘A mechanism is a structure performing a function in virtue of its component parts, 
component operations, and their organization. The orchestrated functioning of the mechanism is responsible 
for one or more phenomena’ ... 
Each of these characterizations contains four basic features: (1) a phenomenon, (2) parts, (3) causings, and (4) 
organization.” 
3 We suppose, like many ‘new mechanists’ (see e.g. Glennan, 2017, especially chapters 4 and 5), that individual 
mechanisms can be grouped under type labels and that the regularities we record as cp laws may arise from either the 
repeat operation of an individual mechanism, and hence be conditioned on the operation of that specific individual (like 
the planetary system) or from the operation of a plurality of mechanisms of the same type. In this latter case they are 
conditioned on mechanisms of that type (e.g. neurons) and could be expected to break down in any specific case where 
the specific token of that type misfires. We shall elide this distinction between types and tokens here because our points 
hold equally for both. 
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Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2005). In this paper we focus on how a mechanism explains the behavior 
recorded in a cp law.4 
 
We will address two closely inter-related questions: 
 
1. An epistemological question: “What kind of explanation is involved?”  
 
2. An ontological question: “What is going on in the world?”   
 
Our use of the term ‘mechanism’ accords both with Cartwright’s original characterization and with that of 
the so-called ‘new mechanists’ (see e.g. Illari and Williamson 2012, Glennan 2017) not only in spirit but in 
the main details. But since we look at only a single function – giving rise to and explaining regularities – 
among the many attributed to mechanisms, we specialize the characterization to suit this function. As 
Cartwright’s original definition has it, a mechanism is a nomological machine if, when operating without 
interference, it gives rise to stable input-output relations (regular behavior) of the kind typically recorded in 
ceteris paribus causal laws.5 For our purposes here we  characterize a nomological machine mechanism for 
regular behavior RB by a set P of parts displaying a specific set ϒ of features (including activities and 
interactions) in an arrangement A which gives rise to behaviour RB if operating repeatedly without 
interference: (M = <P, ϒ, A, RB >).  
 
To address the epistemological question, we enter into the lively debate about covering law versus 
mechanist explanation. We argue, contrary to what many mechanists themselves maintain, that when it 
comes to explaining cp laws, standard mechanistic explanations are a subset of good old-fashioned 
covering-law explanations (though a special subset) and that this is an important contribution to their 
explanatory force. 
 
Explanation is a linguistic enterprise. For the ontology, we need to know what is going on in the world. We 
shall argue that the arrangement of the parts in the mechanism supplies them with features they do not 
possess separately. In the cases we focus on where covering laws play an important role in mechanistic 
explanation, what is happening in the world when M (= <P, ϒ, A, RB >) explains regular behavior RB is this: 
RB is what it takes for some set of principles that govern features in ϒ of parts P in arrangement A  to be 
instanced in the operations M undergoes in giving rise to RB. So, given those principles, (P & ϒ & A) implies 
RB.6.  
 
We speak to the two questions in turn in the next two sections, addressing in each case other answers 
available in the literature before setting out our own position. We stress the interrelatedness of our two 
answers. 
 
 
2. Explaining ‘explains’ – the epistemic question answered 
 
4 Some remarks about terminology. We suppose that in the cases we focus on, mechanisms – things in the world – give 
rise to regular behaviors, which are also things in the world. Accounts of what these mechanisms are like and how they 
operate explain these behaviors, which can be described in cp laws. For ease of expression we shall sometimes talk, as 
is not unusual in discussions in philosophy of science, of mechanisms or mechanistic explanations explaining the cp 
laws that describe regular behaviors. 
5 We shall confine our attention to cp causal laws although mechanisms can give rise to behaviors described in non-
causal laws as well. There is a vast literature on cp laws and on the factors nodded to in the cp clause. We focus here on 
the need to inter alia condition them on the proper operation of the nomological machine / mechanism that gives rise to 
them. The important topic of cp laws is addressed elsewhere by the authors – see e.g. Cartwright 2002, Pemberton & 
Cartwright 2014 – it is not explored further here. Also, we shall use ‘laws’ and ‘principles’ interchangeably, depending 
on what is common usage for the ones under discussion; and, as noted already, where there is no danger of confusion, 
we may not always distinguish cp laws from the behaviors they describe. 
6 Thanks to an anonymous referee for urging us to make this implication explicit.  
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It might seem7 that there is an obvious answer to the question, ‘What sort explanation is involved in 
mechanistic explanation of a regular behavior?’ The answer is that mechanistic explanations explain by 
laying out the structure and operation of the mechanism that gives rise to that behavior, i.e. showing its 
parts, arrangements, interactions, activities and the like. But a vast array of mechanistic explanations across 
the natural and social sciences offer more by way of explanation. They make clear why that structure 
operating in that way gives rise to that behavior. They do so, we maintain, by invoking – sometimes 
explicitly, but often implicitly – familiar laws or principles under which the parts act.  Our thesis is, then, 
that when it comes to explaining cp laws, a great many mechanistic explanations, including paradigmatic 
ones discussed by mechanist philosophers, are a subset of covering-law (CL) explanations and part of their 
explanatory force is due to that.  They are, though, a special subset of CL explanations, where the specific 
facts invoked are facts about the parts, features, interactions and arrangements of the mechanism that 
gives rise to them, which gives them further explanatory ‘depth’, as demanded in point 2 below. 
 
Though we suppose that the covering-law model of explanation is familiar to all readers, to ensure a 
common understanding we quote from CG Hempel’s ‘Two models of scientific explanation’ which lays out 
just what we mean by ‘covering-law explanation’ here:8 
 
This explanatory account may be regarded as an argument to the effect that the event to be 
explained (let me call it the explanandum-event) was to be expected by reason of certain 
explanatory facts. These may be divided into two groups: (i) particular facts and (ii) uniformities 
expressed by general laws. … If we imagine these various presuppositions 
explicitly spelled out, the idea suggests itself of construing the explanation as a deductive argument 
of this form: 
C1, C2, •••, Ck 
L1, L2, •••, Lr 
E 
Here, C1, C2, •••, Ck are statements describing the particular facts invoked; L1, L2, •••, Lr are general 
laws: jointly, these statements will be said to form the explanans. The conclusion E is a statement 
describing the explanandum event; let me call it the explanandum-statement… (Hempel, 2002, 
pages 46-47). 
 
Many mechanists see mechanistic explanation as very different from covering-law explanation. Stuart 
Glennan states that, “New Mechanists are of one voice in seeing mechanistic explanation as an alternative 
to covering law conceptions of explanation.” (Glennan, 2017, page 221.) Antti Revonsuo claims, 
“Explanation in basic neuroscience is a prime example of causal-mechanical explanation rather than 
explanation in terms of universal laws and principles.” (Revonsuo 2001, page 47. Emphasis added.) Or 
consider Craver and Tabery, who title the section on explanation in their Stanford Encyclopedia article 
‘Mechanisms in Science: From Formal Analyses to Material Structures’, where the formal analysis in 
question is the covering-law account: “According to [the covering-law model], explanations are arguments 
showing that the event to be explained … was to have been expected on the basis of laws of nature and the 
antecedent and boundary conditions …. Mechanists, in contrast, insist explanation is a matter of elucidating 
the causal structures that produce, underlie, or maintain the phenomenon of interest.” (Craver and Tabery, 
Section 3 (first para). Emphasis added.) We take it that in this remark “the event to be explained” is meant 
to include the events of our concern here – regular behaviors, and we agree that mechanistic explanations 
in the form of nomological machine models ‘elucidate the causal structures that produce, underlie, or 
maintain’ these regular behaviors – that was just the point of introducing them in the first place decades 
ago. But we disagree that this is at odds with the models showing “that the event to be explained … was to 
have been expected on the basis of laws of nature and the antecedent and boundary conditions.”   
 
7 As an anonymous referee suggests. 
8 We also can include IS – inductive statistical – as well, as we note below. But it seems excessive to lay out that 
familiar definition too. 
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Craver and Tabery note four concerns expressed by mechanists about the covering-law model of 
explanation (Section 3.1):  
 
1. its inability to deal with causal /etiological explanation;  
2. its inability to distinguish re-descriptions of the phenomenon in general terms from explanations 
that reveal the mechanism that produces it;  
3. its possible lack of depth (subsuming a phenomenon under any true law will count as a complete 
explanation so that the level of detail may be insufficient for satisfactory explanation);  
4. its requirement for laws, which may often be unavailable in the biological and special sciences.  
 
Practicing social scientists also sometimes contrast covering-law and mechanistic explanation. For instance, 
in their classic text Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences9, Alexander George and 
Andrew Bennett briefly review the standard philosophy of science literature and argue that mechanistic 
explanation can solve two problems faced by the deductive-nomological (D-N) account, which along with 
the Inductive-Statistical (I-S) account is the standard formulation of covering-law explanation. The first is 
the problem of distinguishing “between causal and spurious regularities” (page 132). This problem is akin to 
1. above.  The “second problem with the D-N model is that its predictions must be rendered with perfect 
certainty”, a problem which, they argue (following Wesley Salmon), the I-S version does not successfully 
solve. This adds another to the list of concerns about covering-law vis-à-vis mechanistic explanation:  
 
5. For covering-law explanation, outcomes are supposed to be fixed by the particular facts and laws 
invoked. 
 
We do not see such a contrast between mechanistic and covering-law explanation. We urge rather that a 
large array of the best mechanistic explanations for regular behaviors work in part because they fit this 
covering-law model. Standard mechanistic explanations of cp laws are not separate from covering-law 
explanations but are a subset of them, and a good number of exemplary covering-law explanations, 
including many that were offered from the very beginning when the covering-law (CL) account first came 
into fashion, are equally exemplary mechanistic ones. The explanation of Kepler’s first law, detailed below, 
which couples Newton’s laws with a description of the parts and interactions of the solar system, is a case 
in point.  
 
For complete clarity let us note that our claim does not imply that everything that fits the CL model is a 
mechanistic explanation, nor that everything that fits the CL model is a good explanation, nor that every 
good mechanistic explanation of everything that might be explained by a mechanism is a CL explanation. 10  
Rather, to repeat, we claim that many good mechanistic explanations – including standard exemplars in the 
mechanism literature – of the behaviors described in cp laws fit the CL model and, moreover, that this is 
responsible for part of their explanatory force. The root idea behind the CL model is that the explanans 
explains the explanandum because the explanandum is to be expected given the explanans. Recall that we 
characterise a mechanism M by a set P of parts displaying a set of features ϒ in an arrangement A. We claim 
then that generally the repeated operation of mechanism M explains the regular behavior RB in part 
because RB is what is to be expected given that a set of principles, λ, that govern features in ϒ all obtain at 
once in the arrangement A of the parts P. The principles, λ, fill in the second of Hempel’s categories and the 
description of the parts P, the significant features ϒ (including interactions) and the arrangement A fill in 
Hempel’s first category “the particular facts invoked”. It is the special nature of “the particular facts 
invoked” – facts about the underlying causal structure that gives rise to RB – that singles out this special 
subclass of CL explanations as mechanistic. Like many of Hempel’s examples,11 these explanations are both 
 
9 George and  Bennett 2004. See also Beach and Pedersen 2013, chapters 3 and 4. 
10 We do not posit a single universal criterion of explanatory correctness and are thus amongst those that James 
Woodward characterises as moving away from a strict universalist position (Woodward, 2014, Section 7, para 1). 
11 For instance, explanation of Kepler’s laws by the structure of the planetary system and the laws governing it. 
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CL and mechanistic at once: they show what the underlying structure that gives rise to the behavior is by 
being mechanistic and they show why that behavior is to be expected by being CL. 
 
For the sake of discussion, we stay neutral about how to interpret ‘law’ in the CL account and about how 
law-like the laws involved are. These may be exact laws (if there are any such), they may be pragmatic laws 
as urged by Sandra Mitchell (Mitchell 1997), they may be causal laws as discussed throughout philosophy of 
science nowadays, they may be tendency laws as discussed in Cartwright and other powers theorists (see 
e.g. Cartwright 1999), or they may be cp laws. 12  
 
Perhaps the feeling of contrast results from focusing on a simple subspecies of covering-law explanations 
that do not, at least on the face of them, invoke mechanisms. For instance: “Why does this neuron transmit 
messages?” Because: “CP, all neurons transmit messages.” Perhaps the role for the parts and their 
arrangements is not transparent in the description of covering-law explanations, since these may get 
lumped under the expression ‘antecedent and boundary conditions’. Or perhaps these boundary conditions 
are conceived of too simply. For instance: To explain Kepler’s 1st law (the planets travel in elliptical orbits 
with the sun as a focus), we use Newton’s F = m?̇?. The boundary conditions include the value of m and an 
initial value of v. Given these we can solve the differential equation to get the elliptical orbit once we have 
written down a specific function for F. That does not look like a mechanical explanation. But of course, far 
more is necessary. We have to fill in the specific functional form of F. For that we need the structure of the 
mechanism. 13 It is common in presenting this Newtonian explanation to use a diagram like Figure 2, 
picturing a simple nomological machine with just two parts, a large object and a small object, arranged 
some distance apart. Their relevant features are the masses of the two objects, M and m, their separation 
r, and the relative velocity of the small mass relative to the larger, which has a component ?̇?  along r and r?̇? 
perpendicular to r. Because of the features of the objects and their arrangement, the larger pulls on the 
smaller with a force GMm/r2. Now we can construct a proper, filled-in differential equation. If we start our 
explanation with that filled-in equation, the role of the parts and their features, arrangements, and 
activities will not be apparent. 
 
12 Often, as an anonymous referee remarks, M is or seems to be in place and operating and the appropriate input occurs 
but the output does not, so B (‘input causes output’) does not occur. That can happen even when covering laws are 
involved in the appropriate way for a number of different reasons: because M does not really obtain (some parts or 
features or arrangements are flawed), something interferes with M’s operation, the laws are only tendency laws or they 
are stochastic or they are even more permissive (e.g. they dictate a range of outcomes but don’t fix a probability over 
them). This last is allowed on Mitchell’s pragmatic view. It was discussed by GEM Anscombe in her Cambridge 
Inaugural Lecture (Anscombe 1971) where she argued that laws may describe a cause that is ‘enough’ for the effect to 
occur but is not logically sufficient for the effect. It is also defended by Pemberton & Cartwright 2014. 
13 You could just treat the specific functional form as yet another ‘boundary’ condition. In this case your CL 
explanation is not properly mechanistic. But the fuller explanation we cite here – which is the standard one – is 
mechanistic: it takes the parts and arrangements and interactions as the boundary condition and uses the law of gravity 
to assign F. 
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Figure 2: Elliptic orbit of small mass around large mass 
 
So, Kepler's laws are deduced from (i) the initial conditions which in this case comprise a description of the 
components of the mechanism – a large lass M (the Sun) and a small mass m (the planet) and their 
arrangement – separated by r and far enough from other sources of force to make any but the gravitational 
attraction between them negligible; and their interactions or activities – mutual gravitational attraction; 
and (ii) Newton's laws, including the general principle that F = m?̇? and the law of gravity that an object of 
mass m located r from another mass M  experiences a force GMm/r2.. The Phillip's curve, which pictures a 
trade-off between inflation and unemployment, is deduced by Chicago School economists in a model from 
(i) the ascription of beliefs to business agents that inflation-related price rises indicate increased real 
demand for their product and (ii) the general principles that agents act to maximize their expected utility, 
along with the bridge principle that an entrepreneur's utility in the setting modeled is constituted by the 
firm's profits.14 
 
Objections 1,2, and 3 adumbrated by Craver and Tabery are thus not relevant to our thesis. It is not the 
case that CL explanations cannot do the jobs Craver and Tabery cite. But they don’t do these jobs just by 
virtue of being CL alone. Like mechanistic models of explanation, CL models can do a variety of different 
things. What exactly a specific CL explanation does beyond what they all do – show what is to be expected 
given the laws of nature – depends on the features of the specific facts and principles invoked in it. We do 
not claim that any derivation satisfying the general covering-law demands can do the jobs Craver and 
Tabery call for. Rather, we claim, if various standard mechanistic explanations can do these jobs, as they 
argue, then so can (many) covering-law explanations since these standard mechanistic explanations of cp 
laws are a subspecies of covering-law explanations. Nor does objection 5 bear on our claims for we do not 
suppose that covering laws are all either ‘deterministic’ or statistical. Rather many of the central covering 
laws used in mechanistic explanations are ‘tendency laws’ (like the law of gravity and Coulomb’s law) that 
tell what a cause contributes to the effect, not what overall effect actually happens, as in the law of gravity, 
 
14 For yet a different kind of example consider CG Hempel’s own reconstruction of John Dewey’s explanation of some 
peculiar behavior he observed in soap bubbles in which the particular facts that enter into the explanans describe the 
parts involved and their arrangement: “the tumblers had been immersed in soap suds of a temperature considerably 
higher than that of the surrounding air; they were put, upside down, on a plate on which a puddle of soapy water had 
formed that provided a connecting soap film, and so on” (Hempel 1970, page 336). Note also Hempel’s remark in the 
famous short text Philosophy of Natural Science: “As this use [to explain Kepler’s and Galileo’s law] of Newton’s laws 
illustrates, empirical laws are often explained by means of theoretical principles that refer to structures and processes 
underlying the uniformities in question” (Hempel 1966, page 51. Emphasis added). 
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Coulomb’s law and the law describing the drag of the air in the Millikan experiment described above.15 This 
leaves objection 4. 
 
In regard to objection 4, we agree that many advances in biology have little to do with the discovery of new 
general laws and almost everything to do with uncovering the structure of systems. But that has no bearing 
on whether general laws play a central role in the models biologists construct of how those systems do 
what they do. However the model is presented, with diagrams and figures, or with equations, or narratives, 
or whatever, why should we believe that structures that match the model can do what they are supposed 
to? The answer, we propose, is very often that these effects are just what is to be expected given the 
features of the parts in that arrangement and the covering laws in which these features figure. The effects 
are just what is to be expected because that is what must happen if all those features act as they should 
under the general laws that govern them. Each of the features – like the mass of the sun and the mass of a 
planet –acts in accord with the general laws that govern it. Their joint actions, in accord with all these 
general laws at once, explain why the system does just what it does. 
 
It may be thought, “Yes, but physics examples are the easy ones. It is no surprise that physics, with its rich 
tool-kit of general principles, uses covering laws in its mechanistic explanations. What about elsewhere?” 
We maintain that physics is not special. Examples of mechanistic covering-law explanations of cp laws in 
the socio-economic sciences, described as such, can be found in Cartwright 1995. These include a money 
multiplier and a debt-generating mechanism. Here we consider one of the mechanists’ own favorite 
examples from biology: signal transmission in the neuron, where the regularly (though far from 
exceptionlessly) occurring behavior to be explained is that the arrival of neurotransmitter particles at the 
head of the neuron leads to the release of neurotransmitter particles from the synaptic vesicles at the 
other end of the neuron shortly after. Figure 3 illustrates a few of the parts and stages involved in such 
transmission.  
 
Figure 3: Some steps in signal transmission in a neuron 
 
Beginning students are typically told, “Signals within neurons are transmitted electrically, however signals 
between neurons are transmitted chemically across the synapse.” (Flannigan et al. 2015, page 117.)  We 
take it that this means that these signals are transmitted in accord with well-known laws of electricity (such 
 
15 For more on tendency laws see, for example, Mill 1967; or Cartwright 1989, chapter 4. 
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as Coulomb’s law) and of chemistry. Here is the basic mechanistic explanation for the electromagnetic 
transmission within the neuron. 
 
Positively-charged sodium and potassium ions sit both outside and inside the neuron. In the rest 
state there is somewhat more positive charge on the outside than inside, so the voltage measured 
from inside is slightly negative. Arriving neurotransmitter particles dock with receptors opening 
sodium and potassium gates in the neuron wall, allowing ions to enter the neuron, increasing the 
positive charge in the cell and the local voltage across the cell wall. If the voltage passes a 
threshold, that stimulates an adjacent sodium gate to open; sodium ions outside flood through the 
gate due to the electro-chemical gradient. The change of charge distribution increases the local 
potential difference across the wall, opening adjacent gates. In the meantime, the open sodium 
gates close quickly stopping the rise in voltage. The stimulus also opens a slower-to-open 
potassium gate and positively-charged potassium ions flow out because the membrane is now 
more negatively charged on the outside than the inside, so the voltage drops. The potassium gate 
then closes. Sodium and potassium pumps then restore the rest state so that the process can be 
repeated. 
 
There is of course more to be said; for instance, concerning the diffusion forces affecting the flow of the 
sodium and potassium ions. But these too behave as they should, according to standard diffusion 
equations. Or, how do the gates open and close? A helical protein string embedded in a pore in the neuron 
wall features an uneven charge distribution and is contorted by this potential difference in a way that 
causes the opening of the passage. Again, this is what is to be expected given the basic laws of 
electromagnetics – which is not surprising since signal transmission across the neuron is modelled 
electrically, as the textbook cited says. Beyond that, one might explain how the protein is structured that 
allows it to contort as it does. That is likely not to use electromagnetic principles. But for satisfactory 
explanation it should use general principles that hold not just in proteins in neuron gates but elsewhere as 
well. 
 
An explanation like this is both mechanical and covering law. The use of covering laws is what makes it an 
explanation and not a mere description of what happens. We understand why the explanandum behavior 
occurs given the structure of the mechanism because that is the behavior that must occur if none of the 
laws cited, which we take to be true, are violated in this mechanism.  
 
Besides objections 1-5 above, others have been raised as well. Kaplan and Craver (Kaplan & Craver 2011, 
page 607) criticize ‘predictivism’ and in the same breath the CL model. But we do not claim the symmetry 
of explanation and prediction and in particular not that everything (like the prediction of the storm by the 
fall in the barometer that Kaplan and Craver cite) that might fit a CL model is a satisfactory explanation. This 
‘symmetry’ claim is back to front from our claim that many satisfactory explanations – especially many 
mechanistic ones—are CL explanations and moreover that part of their force as explanations derives from 
their use of covering laws to derive the explanandum phenomenon. Kaplan & Craver (page 608) also object 
that a law like Snell’s that says ‘Light does X’ does not explain why light does X. But that too is irrelevant. 
The kind of CL explanations of why the neuron transmits an action potential do not just invoke a law that 
says that (cp) they do so.  
 
Holly Andersen (Andersen 2011) takes issue with Bert Leuridan’s (Leuridan 2010) claim that laws (he thinks 
in terms of Mitchell’s ‘pragmatic’ laws) are ontologically necessary to mechanisms, 16 which resonates with 
ours that the regular behavior that is explained by mechanisms generally depends on the operation of laws 
and that this dependence is in part what gives mechanisms their explanatory force. Andersen allows that 
some sciences may not use mechanisms as explanatory devices but may rely only on laws. But she seems to 
deny our claims when she says “Mechanisms… are an alternative to laws as an explanation of regularities,” 
and further claims, “Within sciences like biology and neuroscience, however, there is a fairly 
 
16 See also Craver & Kaiser 2013. 
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straightforward way in which law-based and mechanism accounts of explanation are in direct competition” 
(Andersen, 2011, page 329). But then it seems that by “law-based explanations” she has in mind laws that 
“are based on stable regularities” (page 326). This then seems like laws like Snell’s law that Kaplan & Craver 
discuss. In that case we agree. Explanations of regular behavior by laws that describe that behavior as law-
like and not accidental do not do the same kind of explanatory job as mechanisms and the laws engaged in 
their production of regular behavior.  
 
Again, that not every CL-form deduction is a good explanation and that not every CL-form deduction is a 
mechanistic explanation is tangential to whether standard mechanistic explanations of cp laws are CL and 
that being CL is part of how they go beyond showing what causal structure gives rise to the regular 
behavior to show why it does so. 
 
Next we turn to three conventional objections to CL models that Craver raises: “(i) the problem of 
distinguishing laws of nature from accidents and other non-explanatory generalizations; (ii) the problem of 
providing an account of explanatory relevance; and (iii) the fact that one need not show that a 
phenomenon was to be expected in order to explain it”(Craver, 2007, page 35). 
 
(i) is not an issue for whether mechanistic explanations are instances of CL explanation. There are a variety 
of ways on offer to select out what counts as a scientific principle, including ones we have already 
mentioned like Mitchell’s pragmatic laws account and the tendency-law account, together with the 
invariance account of Woodward that Craver endorses. As best we can reconstruct, Craver himself 
addresses the problem of explanatory relevance in (ii) by way of constitutive relevance (Craver, 2007, pages 
139-160). 17 We, similarly, can appeal to an ontological account of the mechanism (as set out in Section 3) 
as providing a basis for a solution to the problem of explanatory relevance. In relation to objection (iii), Jim 
Bogen argues (following GEM Anscombe) that “causality is one thing and regularity is another” (Bogen 
2008, page 112). Craver notes that “We have no difficulty in imagining quite irregular mechanisms, such as 
the mechanism for neurotransmitter release, that works roughly ten percent of the time, or a rusty 
chainsaw that starts arbitrarily infrequently” (Craver & Kaiser 2013).  In such cases, the phenomenon to be 
explained is not to be expected given the mechanism. There are at least two responses to (iii) that are 
readily available on our CL view. One is that the relevant CL principles may be indeterministic or permissive 
in various other ways (recall the discussion in footnote 12 of the variety of visions in contemporary 
philosophy of science of what scientific principles and laws might be like).18 The other is that the requisite 
features or the requisite arrangement that characterize the appropriately operating mechanism are not in 
fact in place in the cases when the explanandum behavior does not occur. For example, a cistern may not 
flush on some occasions when the handle is pushed if bolts attaching the lever arm to the lifting rod 
become too loose. 
 
Last, Jim Bogen urges that what matters in mechanist explanation is the detailed descriptions of the 
activities, which will be cases of causings but very thickly described. He proposes that what matters in each 
instance is what these activities are and what they do in that instance and not what happens elsewhere on 
other occasions (e.g. in Bogen 2008). This seems to threaten the idea that the activities generally fall under 
more general causal principles. When we look at his cases, however, it seems as if the opposite is true, just 
as in our discussion of the neuron example. For instance, Bogen concludes his example of the exploration of 
fermentation in the latter half of the nineteenth century: “Fermentation turned out to be a physico-
chemical process” (Bogen, 2008, page 121) – that is to say, as we understand him, that the process follows 
general physical and chemical principles. Perhaps it might not always seem that general causal principles 
are in play because the thick descriptions of the activities are not always those that appear in the relevant 
causal principles, since one and the same activity can be described in different ways and at different levels 
of abstraction. For instance, pressing down the handle on a toilet cistern raises the other end of the lever 
 
17 Craver’s proposes a mutual manipulability criterion to resolve the important but vexed question of constitutive 
relevance – see also Baumgartner and Casini 2017, Baumgartner and Gebharter 2016, Couch 2011, Harinen 2018. 
18 See footnote 12 for more on why ‘expected’ behaviour may fail. 
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which pulls up the lifting rod which in turn pulls open the valve – the operation of the cistern follows from 
general principles such as the law of the lever, but there is no general principle that pressing a handle 
opens a valve. 
 
We do not want to be dictatorial about the term ‘explanation’ though. There may be cases in biology and 
elsewhere where features in a mechanism do not obey the general principles that they do outside it. There 
may also be cases where singular causings do not fall under wider principles or laws.19 Either of these last 
two could be what is meant by the claim that the behavior that the mechanism gives rise to is emergent. 
We do not want to deny that there may be emergent behavior in either of these senses. In cases like these, 
describing what is going on in the mechanism when the explanandum behavior occurs is certainly a 
contribution to knowledge; perhaps it is reasonably called ‘explanation’. What we want to stress is that, by 
far and away, most of the satisfying mechanistic explanations in both natural and social science are 
covering-law explanations: we use already familiar laws and principles to show that the behaviour is to be 
expected in settings with just this structure.  It is true that some covering-law explanations are not 
mechanistic explanations. The Hodgkin–Huxley formalism often cited by mechanists or the differential 
equations describing transitions between neuron states in a Markovian scheme are good examples. But, to 
repeat, that some covering-law explanations are not mechanistic does not show that most mechanistic 
explanations are not covering-law. 
 
Recall the job that adding covering laws to the description of a mechanism and its operation is supposed to 
do. The description of a mechanism and its operation shows what structure and activities it is that when 
repeated give rise to the regular behavior to be explained. But that by itself does not show why they do so. 
We observe that in a host of actual mechanistic explanations on offer in science, this job is done by 
implicitly or explicitly invoking laws and principles that are taken to hold generally for the features of the 
mechanism (parts, properties, interactions, activities). We have allowed that sometimes, as in cases one 
might label ‘emergent’, it is just the case that the interactions and activities cited do give rise to the 
behavior in question (which can be verified in a variety of ways) with no more to be said. We are also happy 
to allow that there may be other ways to show why just those interactions of parts with those properties in 
that arrangement give rise to that behavior, though we haven’t come up with any good suggestions 
ourselves. We only claim that a great many mechanistic explanations given in science do it the CL way 
(though perhaps without much note). Supposing, then, that we are right that the covering-law model is 
generally in play in good mechanistic explanations, that answers our epistemic question. Next we turn to 
our ontological question.  
 
 
3. The ontological question answered 
 
Our introductory remarks talked about M ‘giving rise to’ the behavior B that is described in the cp law. This 
is not the only terminology in use. For Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden, and Craver (MDC), M is 
“productive” of B (Machamer, P. et al. 2000, page 3). According to Stuart Glennan, M “produces” B 
(Glennan 2005, page S344). William Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen say that the operation of M is 
“responsible for” B (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005, page 423). Craver and Tabery 2017 add “underlying” 
and “maintaining” (Section 2.1.1.). There are, of course, differing views of the relation between the 
mechanism and the causal regularity it gives rise to. We focus on three leading treatments available in the 
literature, each of which has problems. 
 
Causes 1. We might think in terms of a word that often slips into discussion of this issue and that is 
suggested by the terminology of production: causes. This word takes on different guises in different 
circumstances. Here we think it is unhelpful. In what sense does the operation of a mechanism cause the 
 
19 So: Event 1 causes event 2 but there is no description C of event 1 and E of event 2 such that ‘C’s cause E’s’ is a law 
or principle (of some sort or another). This is explicitly denied by Donald Davidson (Davidson 1963, 1967) but we do 
not want to rule it out. 
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regular behavior B it gives rise to? For concreteness, consider the regular behavior expressed in a cp law of 
the form ‘Cp, Fs cause Gs’. How, for example, does the operation of the toilet mechanism cause pressings of 
the lever to cause the flushings of the cistern?  Generally, causes proceed their effects. But the operation of 
the mechanism and the causal process it gives rise to are simultaneous. Most causal processes are 
continuous in time and thus have intermediate steps. Interrupting these is a conventional strategy for 
preventing an unwanted effect once its cause has occurred. How does that work when the cause is the 
operation of a mechanism and the effect is the causing of G by F?  Also, there should generally be a flow of 
influence from cause to effect, so that perhaps we can mark the putative cause – in this case, that would be 
the nomological machine, say the toilet mechanism -- and find the mark later on the effect – in this case, 
the causing of the toilet to flush by pressing the lever. None of these conventional characteristics of a 
causal relation are easy to find here. So this does not seem a promising starting idea.  
 
Causes 2. A second strategy that assumes the mechanism, let’s call it M, plays a proper causal role is to 
claim that the cp law is under specified. A full specification puts the mechanism into the antecedent of the 
law itself: M and F cause G. This is the approach that Judaea Pearl among others advocates in his work on 
causal Bayes nets (Pearl 2009). It has a number of problems. If it is the operation of the mechanism that M 
is supposed to represent, then F in the antecedent is redundant: if the cistern mechanism operates, the 
lever is pressed. If it is the parts and their arrangement that M represents, are we to think of the parts and 
the arrangement as a cause? This is what Pearl seems committed to since on his proposals M figures into 
the causal graph and into the causal equations in just the same way as F. Yet if M is a cause, we could 
expect it generally to have the kinds of characteristics of causes we just described. But again, it takes fancy 
footwork to maintain that these characteristics are there or explain away the need for them. The use of this 
proposal in Bayes nets faces the additional difficulty that the nodes in a Bayes net are supposed to be 
random variables. That means they have a range of allowed values with a probability distribution over 
them. But what are the allowed values in our toilet example? Any structure, dreamt or undreamt of, that 
has a lever? And where can the probabilities over these come from? 
 
Constitution. This is what is advocated by Craver, according to whom mechanistic explanation “is 
constitutive (or componential)” (Craver 2007, page 8. Original italics).  Craver uses the diagram in Figure 1 
to represent the connection between the phenomenon and the mechanism, stating that: 
 
S’s ψ-ing is explained by the organization of entities {X₁, X₂, …, Xᴍ} and activities {φ₁, φ₂, …, φᴍ} 
(Craver 2007, page 7). 
 
Where S is the mechanism, ψ is the behavior of S ‘as a whole’, the Xᵢ’s are the component entities of S, and 
φᵢ is the activity of component i. 
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Figure 1: Craver’s diagram of a phenomenon and its mechanism (Craver 2007, page 7, Figure 1.1) 
 
  
This constitution account certainly avoids the difficulties facing causation and it seems to work for the kinds 
of cases that Craver focuses on, where the phenomenon is the ψ-ing of a system S, and the mechanism is 
the organized activities of the parts of S itself at each stage of S’s ψ-ing. The canonical example is the 
neuron transmitting a signal, which on Craver’s account just is, or is constituted by, the organized 
components of the neuron and their activities, especially its membrane and gates and the potassium and 
sodium ions. In these cases, S and M refer to the same thing and, as Craver and Tabery put it in the 
Stanford Encyclopedia, “The phenomenon [to be explained] is the behavior of the mechanism as a whole.” 
(Craver and Tabery, Section 2.1.) But what about other cases where the mechanism explains a cp law: ‘CP, 
Fs cause Gs’ where F and/or G may not be features of the mechanism but instead features of inputs and 
outputs to it. For instance, putting five quarters in the machine causes a can of coke to drop out (which is 
true of a vending machine but not of a parking meter). Here the mechanism is employed to explain how a 
single feature that is not a feature of the mechanism itself – F: the insertion of a quarter – causes a 
different feature – G: can of coke appearing in the reception bin – that may also not be a feature of the 
mechanism. Constitution makes sense in the neuron case. Typical synonyms for ‘constitutes’ are ‘amounts 
to’, ‘adds up to’, ‘makes up’, ‘composes’, and ‘comprises’. It seems true that the neuron’s parts doing what 
they do amounts to/adds up to/makes up/composes/comprises its transmission of a potential difference. It 
is difficult to see, though, how the causing of the appearance of the coke by insertion of the coins is made 
up of the operations of the vending machine.  
 
But even if we accept that the activities of M constitute the causing of Gs by Fs, that would not solve our 
puzzle. We still need an account of why. Generally, when it is true that x constitutes y, there is a reason why 
it does so. When x constitutes y, that is not a brute, or isolated, fact. There are other facts without which x 
would not constitute y. The kind of reason can vary from case to case. What matters is that it is not 
arbitrary what constitutes what, or what kinds of things constitute what other kinds.    
 
13 
 
At the Board of Examiners meeting, the Chair takes role and announces, ‘We constitute a quorum.’ Why do 
we constitute a quorum? Because ‘we’ includes the Chair of the Board of Examiners, the Secretary, all three 
external examiners, and five internal members of the Board. That is what the University’s Learning and 
Teaching Handbook says it takes to make a quorum. Later at the meeting you raise your hand after a 
proposal has been discussed. Raising your hand constitutes voting ‘yes’ to the proposal. It does so because 
that’s the convention at the Examiners’ meeting. 
 
The reason of course need not be something written in a rule book. It can, for example, depend on the kind 
of thing that is to be constituted and what that thing is supposed to do. Why can’t a heap of bricks 
constitute a fence? Because a fence is meant to enclose an area, and a heap of bricks does not do that. The 
parts in the arrangement pictured in the diagram in the design specifications constitute the toaster because 
that’s what makes it up and allows it to do its job. 
 
So, even if the relationship between behaviors in the mechanism and those described in the cp law is 
constitution, this leaves an unanswered ontological question, parallel to the one we ask. We ask, ‘What is it 
for a mechanism’s operating to give rise to B’.  If the answer is that its operating constitutes B, what is the 
reason for that?  Why do the joint activities of the parts of the mechanism in this arrangement constitute 
this behavior?  
 
Our answer to our ontological question involves constitution, but not in the way that Craver pictures it. 
Ideas from Adolf Grunbaum (Grunbaum 1963) give a clue as to how. Newton’s laws explain Kepler’s 
because Kepler's laws are what Newton's amount to in the context of the planetary system. The behavior 
described in Kepler's laws constitutes the obtaining of Newton's laws given the features and arrangement 
of the planets and the sun. Travelling in the elliptical orbit prescribed by Kepler just is what it is for a planet 
to do what Newton's laws dictate in the presence of the sun. So, our suggested answer to the ontological 
question (which follows closely our answer to the epistemic question) is this: 
 
Suppose that behavior RB occurs if mechanism M (characterized by parts P, arrangement A and 
features ϒ) operates successfully repeatedly. M = <P,A,ϒ > gives rise to RB if, for some ϒ ’⊆ ϒ and 
general principles λ(ϒ’) governing features in ϒ’, all the principles in λ(ϒ’) are instantiated in RB’s 
occurring.20 
 
John Pemberton’s work stresses a point made widely by ‘new mechanists’: the importance of paying 
sufficient attention to arrangements (Pemberton 2011). Arrangements matter crucially here because they 
confine how general principles are instanced. For example, Towfic Shomar models an arrangement in which 
two charges attract each other yet the one moves away from the other, in part on account of that 
attraction; if it did not, Coulomb’s law would be violated in that arrangement (Cartwright 1999, Figure 3.1a 
on page 60 and Figure 3.1b on page 61).  
 
Arrangements play two roles in giving rise to regular behavior. First, they introduce new features that parts 
do not have by themselves. A strong branch, or a shovel, balanced over a rock or a log becomes a lever, 
which obeys the law of the lever, as levers do wheresoever a lever is found, whether with its end wedged 
under a wheel to heave a car out of the mud or functioning as a seesaw.  Differing distributions of sodium 
ions inside or outside the neuron membrane exhibit differing voltages across the membrane. So, by virtue 
of the arrangement, new features obtain and new laws are called into play. Second, arrangements fix which 
activities happen when: which happen together and which after which. In the neuron, the gates nearest the 
incoming impulse open first, then the next ones along, so that the gates open sequentially along the length 
of the axon, which is typically long and thin. One could imagine a differently-shaped membrane with a 
more symmetric arrangement, which would give rise to very different behavior in the mechanism. Together 
these mean that the arrangements are crucial to what general laws are instantiated in the mechanism and 
 
20 That is, RB is an instance of all those principles holding, just as the earth’s travelling in an elliptical orbit is jointly an 
instance of F = ma and FG = GMm/r2. 
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what the behavior is when they are all instantiated in the same process. This is why arrangements play such 
a central role in mechanistic explanation. But they do so in part precisely because mechanist explanations 
rely on covering laws.  
 
We suppose that the general laws relevant to the features of the mechanism determine the behavior of its 
parts within each arbitrarily short time period. These laws may be expressible by differential equations; or 
laws of heating, compressing (e.g., laws concerning coefficients of restitution), stretching, distorting, 
retarding (e.g. laws concerning friction), dissolving, diffusing, etc. Other laws may be expressible 
qualitatively (e.g., laws governing the cutting of a knife). When the mechanism operates normally, these 
laws obtaining simultaneously for all the parts together in their given arrangement determine the behavior 
of the parts of the mechanism in each arbitrarily short time period and hence the continuous behavior of 
the mechanism through time. Consider the case where input F causes output G, as in the quarters and the 
coke can. Together the laws obtaining for all the parts of the mechanism together are the reason that the 
initial state of the mechanism causes the final state and hence that the stimulus F that causes the starting 
state can truly be said to cause G later.  
  
Consider neuron transmission again. Let F(t) be the arrival at t of neurotransmitter particles at the head of 
the neuron; G(t΄), the release of neurotransmitter particles from the synaptic vesicles at the end of the 
neuron. F(t) causes sodium and potassium gates to open. This is part of the starting state of the neuron. 
Other important aspects of the starting state are that the voltage-gated channels are closed and there are 
more potassium ions inside the neuron than outside and conversely with sodium ions.  The neuron then 
exhibits a continuous, orderly sequence of states over time, sparked by F(t), crucial among them being ones 
which exhibit a potential difference above threshold, which cause the first sodium-gated channel to open, 
which causes later states in which others open, in turn producing a neuron state in which there is a large 
potential difference. So the action potential travels down the neuron’s axon to the presynaptic terminal at 
the end. That in turn causes G(t΄).  
 
Although in Section 2 we focused on Coulomb’s law, in this process we see activities in which a number of 
different well-established general laws are co-instantiated, for instance: 
 
a) A cloud of particles contained by a wall in which there is a gate which is open/closed) can enter/ 
not enter the gate and cross the wall. 
b) A (net) force on a free-moving particle accelerates/moves it in the direction of that force. 
c) A distribution of charges gives rise, via Coulomb’s law, to forces on local charged particles. 
d) A flexible object subject to differential forces on differing parts contorts. 
 
Although these laws are familiar and unremarkable, they are central to the operation of the neuron, as to 
many other mechanisms.  
 
We note that our answer to the ontological question is orthogonal to the issue of whether, and in what 
sense, mechanisms must be able to give rise to regular behavior (see e.g. Andersen 2012, Glennan 2010 
and Krickel 2017) since our claims are about those mechanisms that do give rise to regular behavior. We 
allow that there may be, as Glennan (2010) claims, one-off or ephemeral mechanisms in areas such as 
history, for example. Although these are outside the scope of our study, we can note that in many cases of 
historical explanation, the behavior explained by the mechanism is nevertheless what it takes for all the 
principles governing the features of the mechanism to be instantiated together.  
 
We note too that our answer is neutral concerning other ontological issues associated with mechanisms 
that have been the topic of extensive debate amongst ‘new mechanists’. For example, many ‘new 
mechanists’ have offered accounts of the nature of causal relations which they take to underpin 
mechanisms – Woodward’s manipulationist approach has proved popular (see e.g. Bogen 2005, Craver 
2007 chapter 3, Craver and Bechtel 2007, Glennan 20011, Glennan 2017 chapter 6). Others have explored 
questions concerning the ontological nature of the mechanism, e.g. to what metaphysical category of being 
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does it belong? (see e.g. Kaiser and Krickel 2017, Krickel 2018). Here we remain agnostic as to whether the 
general principles instantiated in the mechanism which give rise to its behavior may be derived from 
change-relating generalizations, Humean regularities, powers, or other causal or non-causal principles and 
whether they may be associated with substances, events, occurrents, continuants or entities in other 
posited metaphysical categories.   
 
4. Conclusion  
 
When a mechanism explains a cp law, generally (a species of) covering-law explanation is in play. When a 
mechanism M gives rise to a regular behavior RB that is described in a cp law, RB is what it takes for some 
set of principles that govern the features of M’s parts in their arrangement in M all to be instanced 
together. These answers to our epistemological and ontological questions, respectively, are closely 
interrelated.  
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